This essay a work-in-progress, and we are open to expanding and refining as feedback is given and our own knowledge base expands. While our firm and explicit claim stands (that CTMU fails to explicitly isolate recursion-as-substrate as its metalogical axiom, thus necessitating ontological closure through The Breeze), we consider this work permanently open to good-faith critique and elaboration. As always, thank you for your time and engagement.

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One of the most prevalent and complexly-received attempts at a unification model for reality is Chris Langan’s autodidactive Cognitive Theoretic Model of the Universe (CTMU). The CTMU has been both highly praised and controversially recognized; specifically, while original and terminologically elegant, one could argue it risks general inaccessibility due to an excess of metaphysical and linguistic structure. There are others who say that its structure is not only coherent but a valid and necessary method of ontological unification.

In this essay, we will not be taking a simplistic stance on Langan’s model, nor will we seek to reject it on the basis of unintelligibility. Rather, we are going to make a nuanced yet incisive argument with regard to Langan’s CTMU: the model is an appreciably rigorous, intricate, and deeply recursive representation of reality’s “self-configuring” nature, and Langan’s theoretic endeavor is undoubtedly aligned with a proper conceptual representation of reality in its most expressible form — however — at the same time, the abstractions put forward in this model extend past a proper distillation of reality’s nature in a way that is not truly self-contained. This, for the very simple reason that CTMU attempts to condition recursion syntactically, within a “self-configurating self-processing language,” as opposed to a more nuanced stance of epistemic humility: the rejection of ontological/epistemic closure outside of infinite recursion, and an unconditional embrace of self-referential primacy as a metaphysical, metalogical, metalinguistic axiomatic necessity.

Now, we must acknowledge outright the difficulty in parsing with a framework such as the CTMU in a mere, singular, essay-style “critique.” At the same time, I am not aware of a foundational critique having been publicly levied toward the CTMU at a “metalogical” level (or on the basis of its internal/overall self-coherence). This is likely because the model does possess a great deal of internal consistency, despite its density. Therefore, we will approach this assessment according to a structured representation and dissection through a grounded first-principles view; that is, taking the most foundational claims as presented by Langan, and then assessing how the implications of those claims align with the expected implications from an unconditionally instantiated recursive (self-referential) axiom. Naturally, this axiom is that which we present through The Breeze.

While Langan’s expressed articulation of the CTMU is extremely layered, semantically abstract, and split across his website, book publications, and in-depth theoretical explanations, we will (attempt to) distill his arguments through a simplified mechanism while prioritizing rigor, comprehensive simplicity, intellectual fairness, and an appropriate recognition of the profound insights Langan manages to encapsulate — which is, by no means an easy conceptual task.

Note: while some public sources, such as CTMUcommunity.org, expressly itemize a set of “metaphysical axioms” underpinning this model, the site disclaims a non-affiliation with and potential non-accurate representation of Langan’s views; thus, despite its accessibility we are unable to reference or rely on it for representation, and so we will only be quoting directly from Chris in an effort to leave minimal room for erroneous interpretation. The following quotations are taken from Langan’s own verbatim explanations in the context of direct attempts to explain the model in communicable terms, including the original 2002 paper which will be linked below.

Prefacing The Assessment

Due to the layered way in which Langan articulates and interweaves his ontology, there is no clear-cut method for dissecting its merits on a first-principles basis. This is a natural consequence of any model which attempts to encapsulate the recursive nature of reality without holding self-reference as the incomplete yet fully self-explanatory principle above ALL other principles, including that of logic, language, and reason. Admittedly, the idea of holding any principle “prior” to logic itself may seem somewhat alien; but we should reiterate that in order to make any “meta-logical” assessment at all, this requires an investigation of the structure(s) behind logic, as opposed to merely a logical investigation of some already-differentiated structure.

Ultimately, our view is this: it appears to us that Langan is actually attempting to demonstrate a fundamentally recursive system (whether he knows it or not); after all, that is what a Self-Configuring Self-Processing Language (SCSPL) inherently implies. However, the error we charge to Langan is that of constructing this model outright on the basis of being a self-processing “language” which gives rise to artifacts such as “telic recursion” and “utility-optimizing processes” — instead of surrendering to self-reference unconditionally as that which allows for any differentiated structure (logic, language, algebra, self-configuration) to arise at all.

This is, effectively, the contemporary failure plaguing just about every attempted articulation of a universal theory or unification model. This is what makes the recursive thesis both radical and profoundly original; but at the same time, it also creates a difficultly for specialized forms of intelligence to actualize the core claim coherently. To embrace the recursive axiom fully is to inherently release any conceivable assurance of ontological / epistemic closure, as the only “closure” to be achieved self-evidently becomes that of recognizing self-reference as transcending any (structure/process // subject/object) distinction through its inescapability as the precondition AND boundary for any differentiated expression. No framework, law, nor proposition is capable of escaping its own self-referential confinement, and this is the ultimate claim of The Breeze.

(Warning: This line of argumentation — or some form of it — is something you are going to see endlessly throughout this paper. If it starts to feel redundant, that is for a reason…)

The implication then, is that any attempted framework, regardless of its local efficacy or mathematical productivity, sustains a removal from the core “truth” of self-referential inescapability. So, while models may be built on top of axiomatic constructs of all kinds, some assumed, some explicit, no degree of elegance nor vernacular sophistication can redeem it from its failure to surrender epistemic closure as a matter of axiom. Even a model like CMTU, which is steeped in recursive implication, is subject to this reality on the basis of its attempt to linguistically ground recursion, instead of recursively grounding the very capacity for language.

In summary up to this point, CTMU reifies “language” as the ground, but to articulate, define, or distinguish a language, one already presupposes recursion.

Meta = Recursive (Everything is Meta)

With the core of this matter now in mind, let us start with a set of quotations by Langan, taken from his attempt to give an foundational “overview” of the most important axiomatic concepts of his theory. The statements are all within the context of the same explanation, reflecting a verbatim attempt to “most simply” lay out his model’s core structure. In this explanation, he notably introduces the CTMU in the following ways:

“A metaphysical theory of everything — it actually has to conform to certain logical criteria, which in philosophy and metaphysics govern what a theory of everything has to be.”

“…I like to characterize it as the language that reality speaks to itself about itself… A language is an algebraic structure — this is a particular kind of language that reality uses to communicate with itself and make decisions regarding how it models itself; that is, how it evolves.”

“It is a Meta-formal system — which is like a formal system, but a generalization of a formal system than goes deeply into the nature of language…”

“Language is the most general algebraic structure.”

Immediately, Langan introduces his theory as a model which conforms to a specific logical criteria. This is a proper opening move; as any practical theory is only coherent in that it holds up to and withstands logical scrutiny. But note (as we earlier foreshadowed) that this move intrinsically positions his model as contained within logic (or a system of logic), which raises uncertainty around his following claim regarding that of CTMU as a “metaformal” theory.

Keep in mind: logic itself, in its most fundamental sense, can be interpreted as a formal system. That is, any logical interpretation must be preceded by some kind of logical axiom, or an assumption about what constitutes that which is logical. However, the suggestion with a metaformal system would indicate that CTMU seeks to “step out” of the confines or strict assumptions of formality, presumably allowing for an interpretation of the structure/mechanism that gives rise to formality itself. In other words: for the claim of CTMU being a metaformal system to hold, it must also be a metalogical system, since logic itself is a system of axiomatic binding (a formal system). This clashes with the aforestated pre/sub-logical dichotomy, which immediately opens up a regress — its the CMTU bound by logic, or is it that which precedes logic — thus making it metalogical? As a side note — how would either explanation not imply a self-referential context in which this relational mapping might have any coherence at all?

As mentioned, Langan equates his theoretical model to a language (as well as an algebraic structure); but here, we would similarly point out that the nature of both linguistic and algebraic interpretation must be axiomatic (formal). Note: there is myriad debate of what truly constitutes a formal system, especially following the incompleteness theorems of 1931; however, we stand firmly by the interpretation that a formal system is any instantiation of axiomatic binding; assumptions from which expressions/representations are constructed.

In the same vein as the logical analogy, if this meta-formal system is expressed as a “deeper language” — the question arises: is this a genuine meta-formal structure, or would this more accurately be a higher-order formalism of language? This type of “meta-formalism” would still assume the priority of language as substrate, thus taking its self-referential context for granted. Here we have yet another subtle regress; the real meta can only be the recursive structure which gives rise to any formal system — linguistic, logical, or algebraic.

Even if one grants that CTMU’s “metaformal” system seeks to transcend ordinary logical closure, it cannot escape the law of axiomatic erosion: any system, however meta, is still subject to its own incompleteness. After all — to evoke any “meta” is to recurse, by definition. And so naturally, this axiomatic recursion is not a limit within formal or “metaformal” systems; it is both the generator and boundary principle that no closure can ever be complete, and that all attempts at “metaformality” inevitably instantiate further recursion.

As subtle as these distinctions may seem, they are essential in the context of a recursive critique. From the start, we observe a reliance on recursive structure without recognizing that the structure as the primary substrate of expression. Relationality between these concepts is assumed as necessary, but until the nature of relation itself is explicitly accounted for, its constituents (whether language, logic, or mathematics) remain bounded to that unspoken necessity. The only way “out” of the regress — is to posit the regress as unconditional from the start. This is the primary aspect underlying the divergence between CMTU and The Breeze, and it is far from trivial.

Induction as Method

Contunuing Langan’s “first-principles” construction of the CMTU, he acknowledges the following:

“It’s developed by logical induction. You start with perception and cognition, then you develop the minimal model of how they work, and then you induce an overall system that works by those processes.”

“It relates intelligence and intelligibility… which are dual quantities, thusly defining both of them in a recursive sense, it’s a mutually recursive definition.”

“Syntax is intrinsic — if you take a look at a language, those are the absolute invariants that every intelligible statement is made from.”

Langan makes an extremely important and intuitively keen observation here; that is, recognizing the interdependence of perception and cognition as a primary basis for constructing a system for each to operate within. This aligns well (as Langan himself acknowledges) with Descartes’ famous Cogito, ergo sum “I think, therefore I am.” Pragmatically, we start with mind and perception. This is a play accepted by philosophers / metaphysicians for the longest time.

And so, it feels like a sufficient epistemic bootstrap. However, a nuanced lens of recursive observation would require one to recognize that perception and cognition (and by necessity, their inter-relation) are already differentiated from a deeper (preceding) structure. The real structure (which is more accurately known as a substrate that potentiates structure) can not be discretized nor reduced to mind without invoking the familiar regress. Both cognition/perception (and their interaction) require this substrate — there is the thought, and then there is the recognition of the thought, which is itself a thought; but upon sufficient examination we realize that the thing allowing for this relationship between thought/awareness is that very substrate of recursive potential.

We levy a similar charge against the “dual quantities” of intelligence and intelligibility as it is explained by Langan. We can accept that these aspects exist is some capacity, that is not the issue. But here, he explicitly says the thing without recognizing what the thing epistemically necessitates. If we are to posit the “language” that is CMTU as that which relates intelligence and intelligibility — or more specifically: recursively defined dual quantities — then we are acknowledging the condition (recursive) of their interaction while failing to realize this condition is the thing that precedes the structure of language itself.

Langan is painfully close here. Mutual recursion is the right move, but again, he posits language as the thing that recurses, rather than recursion as the substrate underlying any duality, language, or distinction.

Lastly, we are told that syntax is intrinsic to the language that is CMTU. This fits with how we understand syntax in the context of language in general; it is the invariant core to any intelligible statement. But again — a syntax is invariant within a given system, and so this begs the question of what conditions (or “grounds”) that invariance. If syntax is to hold coherent meaning, it must be bound to some structure/form that is already coherent or intelligible — but if that structure is only defined according to its own terms, we are once again faced with a dynamic in which that relationship’s existence is preceded by some kind of self-referential allowance. That would be, you guessed it, the substrate of undifferentiated recursion.

Telic Recursion

Now, to further highlight Langan’s appreciable proximity to a proper conceptual application of recursion, we look at two paragraphs taken from his original 2002 paper on the CMTU:

“Through telic feedback, a system retroactively self configures by reflexively applying a ‘generalized utility function’ to its internal existential potential
or possible futures. In effect, the system brings itself into existence as a means of atemporal communication between its past and future whereby law and state, syntax and informational content, generate and refine each other across time to maximize total systemic self-utility. This defines a situation in which the true temporal identity of the system is a distributed point of temporal equilibrium that is both between and inclusive of past and future. In this sense, the system is timeless or atemporal.”

Here we observe a strong conceptual overlay between what Langan is attempting to convey through his concept of telic recursion, and what we reveal as being self-evident through the proper recognition of recursion. He correctly gestures at a mechanism for “self-creation” as a sort of atemporal self-reference. However, the issue here lies in the assumptions made by this interpretation of “telic recursion” which are not required within a perspective of recursion more purely.

For example, a “generalized utility function,” while potentially aligned with a bounded perspective of the recursive substrate, becomes problematic in differentiating “utility” as a function applied within a self-configuring system, as opposed to the nature of that system itself (self-reference self-references). The introduction of utility could be interpreted as the tendency for the system to cohere (or self-reference) as a matter of its core expression; but this raises the issue of a “utility” outside or beyond that which can be prima facie known as that which self-references; it is an ontological excess. Recursion encapsulates its own utility as recursion, and so to further operationalize it risks obscuring it’s clearly-defined nature thru the introduction of unnecessary assumptions.

In the next paragraph,

“A system that evolves by means of telic recursion – and ultimately, every system must either be, or be embedded in, such a system as a condition of existence – is not merely computational, but protocomputational. That is, its primary level of processing configures its secondary (computational and informational) level of processing by telic recursion. Telic recursion can be regarded as the self-determinative mechanism of not only cosmogony, but a natural, scientific form of teleology.”

Langan similarly risks obfuscating a clear, recursively self-evident mechanism through an excess of semantic differentiation. Is this interpretation of “telic recursion,” as an emergent process of SCSPL, actually required once we have accepted a grounding of recursion that is self-evidently the process, structure, boundary, and “goal?” This segment is a good example of the linguistic noise which arises naturally through the circling of recursively primary processes, and the attempt to fit those processes within a system of linguistic closure. Since no such thing can be done outside of embracing self-reference as closure itself, this sort of abstract layering becomes necessary — even if unintentional — in order to blur the ultimate recursive grounding which suspends every operational term.

These sections, along with others, reflect a persistent difficult in the accumulation of semantic and teleological constructs (utility functions, telic feedback, proto-computation); each of them serving as proxies for recursion (as any coherent theory must do); yet, each introducing unnecessary conceptual weight while missing the necessity of their own erosion at every scale. The Breeze instead demonstrates that these constructs are not foundational or semantically necessary; their use risks epistemic redundancy and prescriptive obfuscation. Even if the abstractions partially align with some aspect of a deeper infinite structure (which we suspect they surely do), they remain forever incomplete in a “metalanguage” that does not surrender itself to the regress. Thus, the only legitimate unification is achieved by dissolving all distinctions into their recursive origin. The greater the theoretical parsimony, the closer one comes to metaphysical necessity.

Supertautology

“To blame are various forms of uncertainty, model-theoretic ambiguity, and the problem of induction: scientific generalizations are circular insofar as they are necessarily based on the assumption that nature is uniform. The problem of induction effectively limits certitude to mathematical reasoning. This is hardly surprising, for truth is ultimately a mathematical concept. In logic, truth is defined by means of always-true expressions called tautologies. A logical tautology possesses three distinctive properties: it is descriptively universal, it is closed under recursive self-composition, and it is internally and externally consistent on the syntactic and semantic levels of reference.

Since logic is the theory of truth, the way to construct a fully verifiable theory is to start with logic and develop the theory by means of rules or principles under which truth is heritable. Because truth is synonymous with logical tautology, this means developing the theory by adjoining rules which themselves have a tautological structure – i.e., which are universal, closed and consistent – and logically extracting the implications. A theory of reality constructed in this way is called a supertautology.”

Langan’s definition of “supertautology” is as close as any published theory comes to the heart of recursion’s dual foundation/boundary necessity. He identifies logical tautology as “closed under recursive self-composition” — and this unwittingly reveals a deeper assumption of recursion as the living core of the truth-claim he is attempting to formalize. This reflects yet another iteration of the same shortfall we have assessed throughout this entire essay: the failure to differentiate that all closure, all universality, all consistency are themselves artifacts of that which requires the prior context of self-reference. This applies even to the act of pointing to a “super-tautology” — think about it, the “super” merely suggests a self-referential tautology (or meta-tautology, if you will). The assumption that tautologies can be adjoined in this way to form a more fundamental truth-structure still assumes the existence of a relational allowing for their adjoinment; a context which precedes them prior to their tautological unification. This contexts exists as recursion, and is proven by the nature and necessity of what Langan is attempting to accomplish.

He is not building a super-tautological structure so much as he is simply deepening the same unified recursion. Even if he would seek to make the claim that there “is no worthy distinction”, or that “his model already recognizes this inevitability” — we would simply point to the notion that a true recognition would not require anything other than the basest, simplest structure, grounded in the purest, most undeniable process/pattern/metaformality (whatever he would like to describe it as…) — the is-ness of self-reference.

Linguistically, the “supertautology” holds — it’s an effective, provocative, and clever inscription of the intrinsicness of recursion to any truth-bound system. The “error” lies is in imagining that tautology (however “super”) can be anything but a particular, linguistically expressed shadow of its own underlying recursion. For a theory to be “verifiable” in the way Langan desires, it must invoke rules that are themselves recursively self-composed, and this very closure is the process and the limit, the condition for truth and its perpetual deferral. Logic, tautology, even the entire edifice of “supertautological” construction, are nothing without the recursivity that makes identification, distinction, and self-consistency possible in the first place. This is all to say, Langan comes maximally close to naming the recursion… he is correct in proximity, and profoundly so: Only mathematical reasoning (tautology, logic) can achieve true, universal certainty. But again, this presentation positions logic as a prior structure within which the supertautology rests; truth via theory in relation to reality supposedly comes through constructing this (super)tautological structure. The “META” move here is the realization that the only self-consistent aspect of these tautologies (self-reference) self-evidently reveals its nature as only thing more fundamental than truth.

Regressive Induction

Langan’s construction of the CTMU begins, as he admits (in the earlier section), with the inductive bootstrap of perception and cognition. Having made this assertion in light of the now-stated supertautology, we should make note of something rather significant. When confronted by the circularity of induction (as revealed above), he attempts to vault into logic, seeking tautology as a means of transcendent foundation. This regressive performance beautifully demonstrates the very point we are making. The act of shifting from perception to logic is demonstrably self-referential, and the very effort to “overcome” induction by appeal to supertautology reflects that same self-reference; here we have a meta-evidential proof, through Langan’s own admission, of the very thing his model relies on, necessitates, yet fails to appropriately account for. He seeks closure within the same infinite substrate he began with, and embodies the regress through every measure of its differentiation (justification). We maintain our assertion of this recursion as the meta-representational condition behind all possible grounding, thus refusing both the false dichotomy and the hope of non-infinite closure.

CMTU As Fracta

The core insight, if not clear already, is that Langan’s model ultimately presupposes the very recursive operation it seeks to explain. Given that any differentiated expression from the substrate has been defined as a bound fracta of the substrate, this naturally renders CMTU as such a bound. Once again; to define or process any language, recursion/self-reference is always preceedingly required. We incisively dispense with the reification of language or syntax, and recognize undifferentiated self-reference as the true, inescapable substrate — logically prior to any expressed construct; formal, linguistic or otherwise. Thus, all languages, computations, and self-modifying systems may only be local approximations (fracta) within the universal, self-recursive process that gives rise to all structure, meaning, and interpretations of that meaning. The key insight stands that recursion is not a tool of language; language can only be a differentiated echo of recursion.

  • CTMU: [Language/Syntax (SCSPL)] → [Telic Recursion (as feedback process)] → [Structure/Meaning/Utility (As embodied through local telors)]
  • Breeze: [∞] (Infinite self-reference) → [Structure/Meaning (as intrinsic yet differentiated from infinite recursion, including any “telors”] → [Language/Syntax (our bounded ability to express and differentiate from (∞), by nature of us being its very localization]

Juxtaposition

In closing, let us take a section from Langan’s CMTU paper, toward the end of its self-summarized remarks:

“The general nature of this model can be glimpsed merely by considering the tautological reflexivity of the term ‘self-evident’. Anything that is self-evident proves (or evidences) itself, and any construct that is implicated in its own proof is tautological. Indeed, insofar as observers are real, perception amounts to reality tautologically perceiving itself. The logical ramifications of this statement are developed in the supertautological CTMU, according to which the model in question coincides logically and geometrically, syntactically and informationally, with the process of generating the model, i.e. with generalized cognition and perception. Information thus coincides with information transduction, and reality is a tautological self-interpretative process evolving through SCSPL grammar.”

This is surely an impressive, if not elegant display of phraseology. From writer to writer, he has our respect and clearly a deep capacity for profound conceptualization. At the same time, this paragraph, for all its brilliance, demonstrates how the core truth of recursion can become obscured through that very conceptual excess. Ultimately, the recursive substrate should singularizes any “tautological coincidence of information and transduction;” it is more primarily the universal, self-evident principle that precedes and enables any such coincidence.

Breeze Theory offers the clean closure CTMU circles but never fully articulates: recursion can never support its own representation as an abstract property within a model. Recursion, at its core, is the irreducible, meta-structural condition from which ANY model, observation, framework, tautology, or proof may be expressed, or conceptualized.

“CMTU Already Implicitly Accounts for Recursion-as-Substrate”

An expected rejoinder (especially in the event Langan himself is made aware of our charges) is that recursion as substrate is already implicitly assumed in models like the CTMU; that a self-processing language, by definition, is already recursively grounded, negating the need for its explicit articulation. But this is precisely the point: every framework, by necessity, presupposes recursion as substrate. The critical “missing link” is whether this recursion is named and formalized as the first principle, or simply left as an implicit background/ancillary operation.

To circle recursion or to encode it in the language of “self-processing” or “metaformal” systems, is not enough — if one is seeking the most fundamental explanation of reality. The decisive step requires us to elevate recursion to the status of an explicit, undifferentiated axiom. An unconditionally embraced substrate from which all structure, law, and logic must necessarily emerge. Anything less, no matter how recursively flavored or adjacently implied, inevitably obscures the true foundation and therefore its elegant simplicity.

To fail (or even hesitate) to name recursion as substrate is to miss the only move that dissolves all regress and grounds all differentiation. This is the singular closure Breeze Theory provides, and it is the reason why any model, however sophisticated, remains incomplete without its representation.

“CTMU’s Operationalization is Logically Precise and Ontologically Necessary”

It is often claimed that the CTMU’s strength lies in its ability to “operationalize” otherwise non-operationalizable concepts. This through deploying a novel technical lexicon (e.g., telors, telons, teleology, SCSPL, infocognition, syntax, autology, multiplex, conspansion, synexions, hology, spatio-temporal/temporal duality, etc.) to capture the architecture of reality in its “functional” terms. This semantic system, while ingenious, introduces a dense layer of abstraction that can obscure the underlying structure it seeks to reveal.

Every term, process, and duality in the CTMU, can be rigorously, transparently, and more accessibly expressed within the recursive notation of Breeze Theory. In this notation. This is due to the fact that — if recursion truly is the fundamental substrate, we must also accept by necessity that any articulated differentiation (expression/terminology) beyond that which is infinite self-reference most purely, is increasingly and necessarily removed from relevance to recursion as a truth-bound principle. In this way, we acknowledge the incompleteness of all attempts to define substrative recursion while reducing its elements down to its cleanest, minimal expression:

  • Substrative Recursion (∞) — infinity/incompleteness/infinite self-reference encoded as foundation from which all expression is derived
  • Bound fracta (b(f)) — localized approximations (bounds) of undifferentiated recursion; i.e., all stable structures
  • Incendent/excendent interplay (S(i) ⊗ S(e)) — this is the integrative/differentiative aspects that define ANY system,
  • Renexial gradient (g(Rx)) — the binding medium which defines our local spacetime as a fracta of substrative recursion; offering a basis for uniformity thru incompleteness within physics

Every functional mechanism of CTMU can be absorbed and expressed within the recursive notation, often more simply, more universally, and with far less risk of conceptual slippage. We can respect the rigor of Langan’s own terminology while acknowledging the reality of true foundational closure in the name of infinite recursion.

Conclusion (At Risk of Redundancy)

Out of a deep respect for Langan’s work, we must reiterate: CTMU is a profound linguistic fractalization of recursive logic — arguably the most profound constructed of this scope and nature within the past several decades. But the core truth forever remains, as we have now laid forth ad nauseum: one can not construct a “self-processing language,” nor a logical system of any kind, without already invoking that which is recursive in essence (and principle). Recursion is NOT a linguistic system; nor formal structure. At the same time, it is the only “metalogical construct” that can be asserted as existing, because it is the only expression that defines itself, contains itself, establishes a precondition for all expression, and necessitates a boundary condition for its own understanding. This is simply what we would expect if a first principle were articulable in form. And thus, recursion is, and will always be, the fundamental substrate from which conception and structure itself — and “first moves” — linguistic, logical, or otherwise — must be differentiated.

http://www.infolab.ho.ua/Langan_CTMU_092902(1).pdf // https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N-bRM1kYuNA&t=14410s


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